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Book Reviews: Comparative Politics 
generalists (pp. 52, 157). Baumgartner con- 
cedes that "participation levels were not enor- 
mous" in this latter group, but insists that 
"even small changes can sometimes be impor- 
tant" (p. 158). 
Though he may thus be faulted for over- 
emphasizing the independent effect of 
"rhetoric," Baumgartner vividly illustrates 
how such variables as degree of conflict and 
environment combine with the strategic 
behavior of policy makers to determine the 
nature of participation and policy outcomes. 
His case studies provide not only the most 
systematic account to date of the dynamics of 
educational policy making in France but also a 
generally useful guide to the respective roles 
played by civil servants, interest groups, and 
political elites in the policy making process. 
Moreover, his analysis of the role of parlia- 
ment as the "court of last appeal for potential 
expanders" in France (chap. 8) is quite enlight- 
ening, as is his explanation (chap. 9) of how 
political and structural differences between 
France and the United States have resulted in 
contraction of the debate over nuclear power 
in the former and expansion in the latter. 
Specialists in both French politics and compar- 
ative public policy will thus find this book to 
be a significant and provocative contribution 
to the literature. 
JOHN T. S. KEELER 
University of Washington 
The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of 
American-Iranian Relations. By James A. 
Bill. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1988. 520p. $30.00 cloth, $13.95 paper. 
James Bill has written a most valuable and 
trenchant critique of U.S. foreign policy 
toward Iran in the Pahlavi and post-Pahlavi 
periods. The author has based his study on a 
great array of sources, including declassified 
U.S. government documents (plus those 
"declassified" by the student hostage takers at 
the U.S. embassy after their assault in 
November 1979); personal letters and 
memoranda; interviews with key policy 
makers; internal Iranian sources; and informal 
discussions with U.S. and Iranian public 
figures. Bill has accumulated a wealth of ex- 
perience in his many years of travel to Iran and 
from his numerous studies of Iran's internal 
and external politics. The result is a work that 
is characterized by a high degree of authentic- 
ity and integrity. 
Bill's thesis is that U.S. policy toward Iran 
since the 1940s has been characterized by deep- 
ly disturbing inconsistencies; willful interven- 
tion; fractured communications among the 
numerous official U.S. agencies both inside 
and outside Iran; endemic rivalries among 
members of U.S. civilian and military mis- 
sions; cultural insensitivities and mispercep- 
tions; myopia concerning the alleged com- 
munist threat to Iran; and excessive reliance on 
contacts with Iran's governmental elite, espe- 
cially the shah. Bill believes that these deficien- 
cies were responsible not only for the United 
States' failure to anticipate and act to prevent 
an Iranian revolution but also for its inability 
to come to terms with the revolution after the 
fact. 
Among the most compelling parts of this 
book are the discussion of the genesis of the 
U.S. commitment o the shah in the 1940s; the 
analysis of the interrelationships among the 
various U.S. and.British oil companies; the im- 
pact of private sector figures (such as David 
Lillienthal of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 
David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan Bank, 
and the newly retired but vigorously active 
Henry Kissinger) on U.S. policy; and Wash- 
ington's catastrophic insistence that Iran ap- 
prove a humiliating Status of Forces Agree- 
ment in 1964. With the exception of Truman, 
postwar U.S. presidents receive poor marks: 
Eisenhower because of his sanctioning of the 
CIA coup of 1953; Kennedy because his reform 
proposals were really intended to preserve the 
status quo; Johnson because he believed in the 
shah's use of force and admired his apparently 
stable rule, as well as his support of the U.S. 
war in Vietnam; Nixon because of his blank 
check of 1972 on arms transfers to Iran; Carter 
because he praised Iran's stability and later 
followed Brzezinski's hawkish advice to try to 
derail the revolution-in-progress by a military 
coup(t); and Reagan because of his demonizing 
of the Iranian regime and of course his involve- 
ment in the Iran-Contra scandal. 
There are many lessons to be learned, and 
Bill provides a checklist of some 12 points for 
future consideration to avert the continuation 
of the tragedy in U.S.-Iranian relations. These 
range from a skeptical and questioning attitude 
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toward any sacred cow assumptions in U.S. 
foreign policy making and prevention of 
private interests from overtaking public U.S. 
interests to quashing the urge to attribute all 
problems to communist activity, eschewing 
simplistic resort to force, fully training diplo- 
mats in all the skills needed to understand the 
societies to which they are posted, consulting 
more with nongovernmental sources for ad- 
vice and information, moderating bureaucratic 
conflict, and instituting long-range planning. 
It detracts nothing from the integrity of Bill's 
scholarship to note, however, that almost no 
one anticipated that a revolution would break 
out in Iran. It is also not patently obvious that 
the sort of subtle and orchestrated pattern of 
initiatives and responses preferred by the 
author to assist in the evolution of Iranian na- 
tional development is in fact feasible. Given 
what we know about the enormously compli- 
cated problems of formulating and implement- 
ing foreign policy, it should be relatively clear 
that actions are often the outcome of unin- 
tended causes. This problem becomes all the 
greater when it is appreciated that revolution- 
ary movements have a momentum and force 
of their own, a point made by Gary Sick in All 
Fall Down (1985). Even under nonrevolu- 
tionary circumstances, the foreign policy proc- 
ess can sometimes be such a bewildering series 
of fits and starts; assumptions and plans; bar- 
gaining, payoffs, and side-payments; initia- 
tives and demarches; implementation and sub- 
version-that it can defy efforts at careful ra- 
tionalization. Finally, while great powers have 
historically found it relatively easy to roil the 
waters in their relations with small states, ef- 
forts at regulation of developments have been 
far less successful. The question must be stark- 
ly posed: What are the limits to great power 
ability to modulate trends in other lands? 
Yet I take it to be James Bill's response that 
even if this ability is limited, it is possible for 
great powers to be less disruptive, less inter- 
ventionist, less provocative, less insensitive, 
less domineering, less cavalier. Those who 
have studied U.S. relations with Middle East- 
ern countries such as Iran and in general with 
Third World countries deemed vital to U.S. 
security interests can only say amen. 
SHAHROUGH AKHAVI 
University of South Carolina 
Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth 
Century Mexico. By Roderic A. Camp. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
306p. $35.00. 
Law and Market Society in Mexico. By George 
M. Armstrong, Jr. New York: Praeger, 
1989. 174p. $39.95. 
No one seems to be able to come up with a 
term capturing, the essence of the Mexican 
economic system. Massive state intervention 
rules out capitalism or market economy; 
socialism is hardly compatible with the enor- 
mous accumulation of personal wealth by a 
fortunate minority; and planned economy fails 
because plans are routinely ignored or 
aborted. Neither Armstrong nor Camp at- 
tempts to coin a satisfactory term; rather, they 
enrich our insights as to why Mexico's 
economic system seems so label-proof. 
Armstrong employs a historical-legal ap- 
proach in analyzing the origins of contempo- 
rary socioeconomic difficulties in Mexico. 
These problems, he believes, stem from endur- 
ing cultural traits and traditions that prevented 
Mexico from developing a materialistic society 
imbued with egoism and individual autonomy, 
which are prerequisites for a market economy. 
Communitarian paternalism, which was pres- 
ent in the initial blending of Indian and 
Spanish cultures, has endured; and in that con- 
text earlier practices of mortmain, entail, and 
debt peonage are directly connected with to- 
day's corporatist practices of the PRI, graft 
and corruption by public officials, and the 
"6tatization" of the Mexican economy through 
state enterprises. 
Camp is perhaps best known for his Mexican 
Political Biographies, 1935-1980 (1982) and In- 
tellectuals and the State in Twentieth Century 
Mexico (1985). In Entrepreneurs and Politics 
he continues to use personal interviews as the 
basic methodology. Essentially, the book is a 
report on empirical findings on the changing 
relationship between the entrepreneurial class 
and government. The analysis draws on an up- 
dated collection of political leaders (2,850 com- 
plete cases since 18841), interviews with lead- 
ing intellectuals, and his more recent inter- 
views with prominent Mexican entrepreneurs. 
In addition, Camp compiled information on 
the interlocking associations of leading entre- 
preneurial groups and families who have ties 
with the two hundred top Mexican firms. 
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